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Chapter 1
Introduction: Changing Retirement
Policies and Patterns in
Higher Education
Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
As the new century begins, the tectonics of the faculty labormarket are shift-
ing rapidly. The aftershocks of these movements are challenging colleges
and universities to confront a wide range of faculty resource and compensa-
tion policies.This book focuses on retirement and retirement policies—the
back end of the labor market, but it is this end that drives or deeply affects
such issues as new faculty hiring, the ability of colleges and universities to
change the direction of teaching and research, and the age structure of the
faculty. The reason for such a focus is that we are now gaining experience
with what to do about a fundamental shift in the retirement rules: the end
of mandatory retirement.
Until 1994, mandatory retirement was an integral component of human
resource policy for academic personnel at most of the nation’s colleges and
universities, especially research institutions. On January 1, 1994, at the end
of a seven-year exemption, an amendment to the U.S. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) took effect, ending mandatory retirement for
tenured faculty.1 At that moment, most colleges and universities confronted
a significantly altered academic labor market, one in which tenured faculty
could not be required to retire at any specified age.
Higher education already faced some significant academic personnel is-
sues based on widespread concerns about three perceived trends: (1) a fac-
ulty ‘‘bulge’’—a disproportionate number of faculty hired in the 1960s and
early 1970s to teach the baby boomers and who are now approaching age
60; (2) a ‘‘surplus army’’—a large number of people who received doctoral
degrees in the past ten years compared to the number of academic job open-
ings during that period; and (3) modest or no increases in higher educa-
tion budgets (Bowen and Sosa 1989; Finkelstein, Seal, and Schuster 1998;
National Research Council 1993; Brewer, Gates, and Goldman 1998). To
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2 Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
makematters worse, these trends in the higher education labormarket were
thought to be concentrated in some fields—physics and English, for in-
stance—more than others—for example, in computer sciences (National
Research Council 1998).
Therefore, on top of possible negative effects of limited budget increases,
a faculty bulge, and a surplus doctorate army, elimination of mandatory re-
tirement as a personnel policy raised several additional concerns among
academic administrators. First, many feared a decline in academic quality
if senior professors remained on the job past the traditional retirement age.
Second, these administrators anticipated a reduced ability to renew and
enrich their faculties by hiring either newly trained assistant professors or
senior professors with established reputations. Third, they expected a loss
in flexibility to reallocate faculty positions to emerging areas of interest and
in response to shifts in student demand. Finally, they pondered the possi-
bility of higher costs associated with retaining senior professors instead of
hiring newer, entry-level professors.
These management concerns contrast with the legitimate interest of fac-
ulty members in obtaining an employment right granted by Congress to al-
most all other American workers.This new right bestowed on individual fac-
ulty members an economic benefit that they could exercise by choosing to
continue working past age 70 or by ‘‘selling’’ the benefit back to the univer-
sity in exchange for their earlier retirement. In comparison to earlier years,
universities could not force older faculty to retire, but they could continue
to offer financial incentives to encourage retirement at younger ages.
Before 1994, two major studies, by Hammond and Morgan (National Re-
search Council 1991) and by Rees and Smith (1991), respectively, assessed
the likely impact of ending mandatory retirement in higher education.
These studies reached five major conclusions.
Retirement ages in higher education. Most faculty retired before reaching the
age of 70. Faculty at the majority of colleges and universities—institutions
where tenured faculty teach a relatively large number of courses each year
and have relatively less access to research funds, graduate students, and op-
portunities for publication—traditionally chose to retire well before age 70.
Through the 1980s, most faculty followed the trend in the American work-
force toward voluntary retirement at earlier ages.
Retirement ages in research universities. A bunching of faculty retirement at
the required retirement age of 70 occurred primarily at the major research
universities. Faculty at research universities—institutions where tenured
faculty teach relatively few courses per year and have greater access to re-
search funds, graduate students, and opportunities for publication—chose
to retire later than their colleagues elsewhere. At private research univer-
sities with mandatory retirement, about 35 percent of the faculty who re-
tired did so at the mandatory retirement age, while at public universities
with mandatory retirement policies, about 18 percent retired at age 70. At
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Introduction 3
a very small number of universities, more than 50 percent of faculty retired
right at age 70.These studies anticipated that the proportion of faculty who
continue to work past age 70 in a post-mandatory retirement world will be
related to the proportion who worked right up to age 70 prior to 1994.
Faculty performance and aging. These studies found no evidence that age
predicts professional vitality in college teaching or research. Instead, studies
on aging and performance show that variations in ability and competence
are greater within age groups than between age groups. Special studies of
higher education faculty teaching and research failed to show strong age
effects among faculty who chose to keep working. Instead, there was evi-
dence that negative feedback on research and teaching, at some institutions,
led to faculty self-selection (i.e., exit from employment).
Tenure and faculty dismissals. Despite having tenure, faculty could be, but
rarely are, dismissed for poor performance. The legal status of tenure
doesn’t prevent faculty dismissals for poor performance. Appropriate post-
tenure review programs can be used to provide incentives for faculty to
maintain a record of good performance, to encourage poor performers
to improve or leave the institution, and to dismiss poor performers who
neither improve or leave on their own. Some institutions have instituted seri-
ous posttenure review. The obstacles for those who haven’t are more often
anthropological than legal.
Retirement incentive programs. Retirement incentive programs could induce
faculty to retire earlier. Designed well, phased or early retirement incen-
tive programs have affected faculty retirement in the past. Specific tools
include cash payments, pension credits, part-time teaching, and continu-
ing access to campus facilities (e.g., library card, parking, office space, and
other perquisites). Costs of specific programs vary widely; high-cost incen-
tive programs can be a significant portion of an institution’s faculty compen-
sation budget. But in the past, the uncertain legal status of retirement in-
centive programs—particularly upper age limits in what are called ‘‘window
plans’’—have dampened their use.
In summary, the studies reported that the effects of endingmandatory re-
tirement would impose significant costs on the nation’s research universities
and to a lesser extent on other colleges and universities.They also noted that
retirement incentive programs and related programs were effective tools to
deal with issues affecting the broadest swath of institutions, including lim-
ited budgets and labor market trends. Consequently, these studies recom-
mended that mandatory retirement should be allowed to lapse, as long as
Congress legally enabled all colleges and universities to use tools, such as
age-based retirement incentive programs, that would enable institutions to
provide positive incentives for faculty to elect early retirement.
Since these reports were issued, there has been no systematic follow-up.
Based on individual campus-level experience, but without the opportunity
to compare across campuses or to obtain national data, some academic ad-
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4 Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
ministrators have become increasingly concerned that older professors are
in fact remaining on the job too long. Many are worried that delayed retire-
ment is already adversely affecting the academic quality and financial con-
dition of their institutions. And these concerns are compounded by what
administrators report to be an increasing age structure at many colleges and
universities as well as uncertainty about future institutional revenues and
costs.
Some institutions, particularly private colleges and universities, have
found that benefits and age discrimination laws have tied their hands by
inhibiting them from instituting age-based retirement incentives. In Sep-
tember 1998, as part of theHigher Education Act reauthorization, Congress
passed legislation allowing all higher education institutions to use certain
types of age-based retirement incentives, specifically incentives that expire
when a facultymembers reaches a certain age, but there has been as yet little
attention given to this new law.
Thus, there is a strong and growing need for a national discussion of these
concerns, an examination of new evidence that might bear on them, and
a consideration of newly available practical options for colleges and uni-
versities. This book addresses these important issues. The analysis outlines
the critical issues associated with ending mandatory retirement in higher
education and examines reasons for changes in age-specific patterns of fac-
ulty retirement. Research presented in this volume shows what the effects of
these changes are, how they interact with other trends in higher education,
and where they have beenmost severe. Several chapters analyze appropriate
use of retirement incentive programs and other methods of increasing fac-
ulty turnover.Throughout this examination of the changing academic labor
market, the discussion reflects the current thinking of key academic admin-
istrators, faculty groups, and other expert policymakers and practitioners—
all of whom share an interest in determining the extent of any problems
that have been caused by changes in retirement behavior and what new poli-
cies, if any, are needed.This debate is shown through a series of chapters by
leading thinkers on retirement patterns, policies, and programs in higher
education.2
Employment Rights and Retirement in Higher Education
Until the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and its
amendments, human resources policy in most institutions of higher edu-
cation had two basic elements: the tenure system, which provided faculty
members considerable protection against loss of employment, and manda-
tory retirement, which required professors to relinquish tenure along with
their job rights at a predetermined age.
Compensation systems and retirement programs were developed around
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Introduction 5
these two basic features of the academic labor market. At many institutions,
regular increases in salary with years of service implied that older professors
would be paidmore than younger faculty.The design of retirement plans re-
flected the assumption that retirement would occur at or before the manda-
tory retirement age.
One implication of a system based on tenure and mandatory retirement
was that at many institutions, while pretenure review was quite rigorous,
posttenure review was less so.Tenured faculty members were (and are) only
rarely dismissed for lack of professional productivity. Prior to 1994, manda-
tory retirement could serve as a relatively uncontroversial means to ensure
an endpoint for an academic career that had been less than fully successful.3
An important, unresolved question is whether less rigorous posttenure
review was in fact a result of mandatory retirement policies. If the existence
of mandatory retirement was the primary explanation for less rigorous post-
tenure review, then the elimination of mandatory retirement rules should
lead to changes in the review process on many campuses. Alternatively, less
rigorous posttenure review might also be consequence of other aspects of
the ‘‘culture’’ of higher education, including collegial governance. If the aca-
demic culture is the stronger explanatory factor, then the end of mandatory
retirement might not be accompanied by any changes in posttenure review
processes.
The end of mandatory retirement essentially awarded the current cohort
of older professors an unanticipated newproperty right—albeit one that was
already enjoyed by almost all other American workers—the right to remain
on the job until they decided to retire, regardless of their age.To the extent
that professors exercise this new right, their behavior will directly affect the
faculty age structure and labor costs at their institutions.
A review of the current size and age structure of the academic labor force
indicates the key importance of retirement policy (Bowen and Sosa 1989;
Atkinson 1990; Finkelstein, Seal, and Schuster 1998). Becausemost colleges
and universities are long past the growth years of the 1960s and early 1970s,
employment opportunities for newly trained Ph.D.s in most fields are cre-
ated when older faculty retire and vacate their academic positions. If older
faculty remain on the job, fewer vacancies occur, and thus fewer new assis-
tant professors are hired.
Examination of the current age structure of the academic labor force in-
dicates that retirement policy will become a more important issue in the
next ten to fifteen years. During this period, the relatively large number of
faculty hired in the late 1960s and early 1970s will begin reaching the tradi-
tional retirement ages. To date, any decline in age-specific retirement rates
has resulted in only a few additional faculty members remaining on the job,
because a relatively small number of professors are currently in their 60s
and 70s. However, a much larger number of professors will attain these ages
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6 Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
within the next two decades. As a result, any future decline in retirement
rates will have a more significant effect on new employment opportunities
at many universities.
Many academic administrators fear that a decline in retirement rates will
adversely affect the cost or academic quality of their institutions. Institu-
tions can elect to counter declines in retirement rates with the use of early
and phased retirement programs that offer a financial incentive for older
professors to retire. In effect, such programs allow the institution to buy
back the new employment right fromolder professors.Whendesigning such
early retirement programs, administrators must decide whether the gain to
the institution of having older professors retire is outweighed by the added
financial cost of the early retirement option.
Is the Age of Retirement Increasing?
National-level information about the length of faculty careers is indicative,
but far from definitive. The National Research Council has been collecting
sample survey information about the oldest Ph.D. holders for less than a de-
cade, but a separate analysis of faculty is not available. Similarly,TIAA-CREF
data indicate that today’s higher education and research institution employ-
ees exhibit a bifurcated pattern; some begin receiving retirement income
much earlier while others do so much later than their predecessors, but an
analysis of the faculty is not available. Developments like these have caused
concern among administrators that a large number of professorsmight work
well past age 70 in response to the end of mandatory retirement.
To examine changing retirement patterns in depth,OrleyAshenfelter and
David Card (1998) conducted a preliminary study that focuses on faculty
retirement decisions using employment records from a national sample of
colleges and universities. They compiled employment records from thirty-
seven institutions, consisting of eleven research universities, three degree-
granting institutions, thirteen comprehensive colleges, and ten liberal arts
colleges for the years 1986–1995.4They used these data to examine the work
and retirement decisions of a sample of 5,035 faculty members employed
at these thirty-seven institutions who are age 50 or older. In addition to the
employment records of this sample of faculty members, the researchers ob-
tained the value of retirement funds for those persons whowereTIAA-CREF
participants.5 They offered a preliminary report from an ongoing project
that includes an effort to expand the number of colleges and universities in
the sample to over one hundred.
Ashenfelter and Card use these data to estimate parameters in a model of
an individual’s decision to retire at any specific age, both before and after the
ending of mandatory retirement. They reached the following conclusions:
End of mandatory retirement. In themandatory retirement era, about 20 per-
cent of faculty who reached age 70 were forced to retire and 40 percent vol-
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Introduction 7
T 1. Tenure Track Faculty Retirement Rates at Age 70 by Cause:
Preliminary Results for Sample of 37 Institutions
Number of Voluntary Mandatory Other
Period observations retirement (%) retirement (%) reasons (%)
All institutions
Mandatory (1986–93) 510 40.8 22.0 2.4
Post-mandatory (1994–95) 140 29.7 2.0 2.0
Change — −11.1 −19.9 −0.3
Research institutions only
Mandatory (1986–93) 413 42.6 22.0 1.9
Post-mandatory (1994–95) 110 25.5 2.7 2.7
Change — 17.2 −19.3 −0.8
Source: Ashenfelter and Card (1998), Table 6.
Those not retired at age 70 in the mandatory retirement period were retired the next year.
untarily retired at age 70. After the elimination of mandatory retirement,
the fraction of faculty retiring at age 70 declined sharply. The retirement
rate at age 70 is now similar to the retirement rates at ages 68 and 69.
Research universities. Faculty at research universities have significantly
lower retirement rates than faculty at other types of institutions. Faculty with
higher salaries are less likely to retire; a 10 percent higher salary results in a
0.6 percentage point reduction in the probability of retirement. Retirement
rates didn’t vary significantly by gender or race.
Pension wealth. Among faculty covered by TIAA-CREF, a 10 percent in-
crease in the value of the individual’s total TIAA-CREF account balance at
age 67 increased the likelihood of retirement by 0.1 percentage points from
12.0 percent to 12.1 percent. During the 1990s, the retirement rate of fac-
ulty in their 60s rose.This might be due to the unanticipated increase in the
values of TIAA-CREF retirement accounts associated with relatively high
rates of returns during this period.
Table 1 is drawn from Ashenfelter and Card and shows the national de-
cline in retirement rates of faculty whowork until age 70. Before elimination
of mandatory retirement, about 65 percent of faculty turning age 70 retired
that year (virtually all of those that did not retire then were forced to retire
the next year by the mandatory retirement rules). Following elimination of
mandatory retirement in 1994, only 34 percent of faculty reaching age 70
at all institutions (about 31 percent at research universities) retired.
In Chapter 2 of this volume, Robert Clark, Linda Ghent, and Juanita
Kreps present their estimates of how age-specific retirement rates have
changed at three North Carolina universities. They examine data on fac-
ulty retirement decisions, specifically the 1988–97 employment records of
Duke University, the University of North Carolina (UNC), and North Caro-
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8 Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
lina (NC) StateUniversity.They reached conclusions that are consistent with
the findings of Ashenfelter and Card:
Retirement age. Between 1988 and 1997, the average age of faculty mem-
bers at each of these universities increased by over 2 years with the mean
overall age for the faculties increasing from 46.5 years to 49 years.The pro-
portion of the faculty less than 40 years of age decreased from 27 percent
to 18 percent between 1988 and 1997, while the proportion aged 55 years
and older rose from 24 percent to 29 percent. This aging was the result of
both an increase in the average age of new faculty, as well as a decline in
retirement rates among existing faculty at all ages.
End of mandatory retirement. Retirement rates for persons reaching the
mandatory retirement age declined sharply following the end of mandatory
retirement. Retirement rates for persons age 69 at the beginning of the aca-
demic year fell from61 percent to 38 percent after the elimination ofmanda-
tory retirement. The retirement rate for those age 70 at the beginning of
the academic year dropped from 77 percent before 1994 to 13 percent after
1994. These figures are even more dramatic than the national-level data re-
ported by Ashenfelter and Card.
Pension plan. Faculty who participated in the Teachers and State Employ-
ees Retirement Plan (a defined benefit plan available only to faculty at NC
State and UNC) were 10 percentage points more likely to retire at any age
than participants in one of the defined contributions (including TIAA-
CREF) offered by the three universities. After the elimination of mandatory
retirement, predicted retirement rates declined for persons in the state re-
tirement plan but increased for those in one of the defined contribution
plans. This finding is consistent with the observation of Ashenfelter and
Card that participants in TIAA-CREF were more likely to retire during the
1990s and this might be associated with unanticipated increases in account
balances.
Based on both of these preliminary studies, endingmandatory retirement
has had an observable effect on the retirement decisions of faculty, espe-
cially at research universities, where professors who reach age 70 are less
likely to retire now than before 1994.This effect is tempered by an recent in-
crease in the retirement rate for all faculty in their 60s, so that fewer faculty
reach age 70 than in the past.
Legal Status of Retirement Incentive Programs
Since colleges and universities can no longer rely on mandatory retirement
policies to force retirement, they must now look to voluntary retirement in-
centive programs if they wish to affect faculty retirement decisions. One of
the most critical issues affecting colleges and universities with defined con-
tribution pension plans, especially those in the private sector, is the chang-
ing legal status of retirement incentive programs. In Chapter 3, David Raish
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Introduction 9
analyzes the legal issues associated with retirement and retirement incentive
programs in higher education.
In conjunction with defined benefit pensions, retirement incentive pro-
grams are clearly legal and have been used frequently by public sector col-
leges and universities to provide inducements to increase faculty retirement
rates. In this setting, formal retirement incentive programs are most often
part of a public-sector pension plan and therefore not subject to Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) requirements. Such programs can
also take advantage of age-based formulas already built into defined bene-
fit plans, which can also be modified to accommodate increased retirement
incentives.
Since most (though certainly not all) defined contribution plans are of-
fered by private colleges and universities, until recently they were often sub-
ject to ERISA and ADEA rules and regulations effectively limiting the use of
certain policies, such as those associated with upper age limits. In addition,
because of the way in which defined contribution benefits are structured,
these pensions do not typically or explicitly link benefit payout streams to
age.6
The nature of most defined contribution plans—namely, that there is no
age-related benefit that can be altered to provide a retirement incentive—
presents additional challenges for an employer who wishes to target retire-
ment incentives at a key group of professors within a specific age bracket.
For example, a promise to provide faculty of any age an incentive payment
would allow recipients to wait until they would have retired anyway and still
receive the payment.Thus, for these professors it would no longer act as an
incentive to retire early.
Therefore, in order to be effective as well as economical, retirement in-
centive programsmust induce a sufficient number of faculty to retire before
they might otherwise do so, thus freeing up salary dollars to be used for re-
placement hiring. Consequently, retirement incentive programs offering a
lump sum payment are thought to work well when faculty can be offered
an age window during which they are eligible to apply for the retirement
incentive.
Until recently, the legal status of including an upper age limit in such
a program was cloudy. In the past, some experts argued that the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act prohibited offering retirement incentives
to younger employees and not to older employees. ADEA clearly permits
offering retirement incentives to older employees but not to younger em-
ployees. Therefore, some believed that a defined contribution window pro-
gram could have a lower age limit, but not an upper one, thus effectively
keeping the window of opportunity open forever for faculty who are over
the initial age threshold. Others believed that an upper age limit is permis-
sible for a retirement incentive program used with a defined contribution
pension. Without clarification of this issue, many colleges and universities
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10 Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
believed that they would have to offer retirement incentive payments to all
faculty over a certain age and further believe that this outcome would be
ineffective, costly, and self-defeating.
Compromise legislation intended to address these issues was proposed
several times during the 1990s and received support from most of the pri-
vate and public interest groups concerned with higher education and aging,
as well as from the appropriate congressional committees. This legislation,
which finally passed in September 1998, provides a safe harbor allowing col-
leges and universities to offer, with certain significant restrictions, retire-
ment incentive programs with an upper age limit. Such a limit would enable
all college or university employees who reach an initial threshold, for ex-
ample age 60, to pass through a window of opportunity during which they
could choose to apply for retirement incentives. However, once they pass
beyond the upper limit, for example age 65, they would no longer be eli-
gible for the program.The new legislation also requires that any retirement
incentive program be offered for a sufficient time period so that all employ-
ees can become aware of the program’s details and have the opportunity to
consider their options carefully.
In January 2000, the Supreme Court somewhat limited court protection
for the safe harbor for retirement incentive programs as they apply to public
employees. Public colleges and universities may still offer such incentives,
especially in connection with defined benefit plans. Public sector defined
contribution-based retirement incentive plans with upper age limits may
still enjoy safe harbor protection through the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission.
Raish outlines current ADEA, ERISA, and state laws that pertain to the
safe harbor provision, an important tool that has been available to other
U.S. employers and employees and is now available to private colleges, uni-
versities, and faculty. Such a change enables college and universities that
find they are suffering or will suffer negative consequences from the end
of retirement to offer clearly legal, cost-effective programs focused on the
problems they have encountered.
Design and Use of Retirement Incentive Programs
Individual campus experience with retirement incentive programs reflects
each college and university’s unique circumstances as well as factors that
are common to many institutions. In Chapter 4, John Keefe evaluates the
current understanding and use of retirement incentive programs in higher
education. Keefe surveyed private and public institutions, with special at-
tention given to research universities and liberal arts colleges. The survey
focused on plans in which faculty receive severance payments as an incen-
tive to retire as well as on phased retirement plans in which senior faculty are
offered part-time work at prorated salaries in exchange for giving up tenure
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Introduction 11
and retiring.Keefe approached 125 institutions and received responses from
sixty-six institutions on seventy-seven different plans. Eighty percent of the
responding institutions currently offer an early retirement or have done so
within the past few years.
Under the incentive plans, the amount of the severance payments at pri-
vate institutions vary from 40 percent of final salary to 200 percent of final
salary with most of these institutions offering between 100 and 200 percent
of final salary. Payments by public institutions were smaller, ranging from 12
percent to 100 percent of final salary. Most plans provided for a single lump
sum payment.
Phased retirement plans vary considerably across institutions, based on
the duration of the contract, the amount of work, and the relationship be-
tween workload reduction and salary reduction. Both incentive and phased
retirement plans can be either formal (offered through a documented pro-
cess whose details are well known to the faculty) and informal (often un-
documented and offered by administrators to selected individual faculty
members with details that vary according to each case).
Retirement incentive plans can be ongoing programs or they can be of-
fered only for a specified time period. Legally, an ongoing program is sub-
ject to being declared an employment benefit like the basic pension plan. If
so, it becomes subject to ERISA and other employee benefit rules and laws.
Ongoing programs are, for example, difficult to withdraw without appropri-
ate notification, and they must be fully funded. In contrast, a time-limited
program is designed to end and therefore is not considered to be a benefit
subject to ERISA and other employee benefit rules and regulations.
Some institutions attempt to respond to short-term faculty retirement
issues by introducing a temporary incentive plan to induce an immediate,
one-time reduction in staff. Other institutions introduce ongoing plans in
an effort to permanently raise age-specific retirement rates. Sixty of the
seventy-seven plans in the survey were ongoing and seventeen were tempo-
rary plans. Most of the temporary plans were offered at public institutions.
The objective of most of these plans was to entice individuals to retire be-
fore age 65, well below the former mandatory retirement age of 70. Most
important, Keefe found that virtually all of the institutions did not men-
tion mandatory retirement as a reason for the introduction of retirement
incentive plans. In fact, only one institution specifically indicated that it had
adopted an incentive plan in response to the elimination of mandatory re-
tirement.
Window plans offer special retirement options that are available only for
a short period of time and/or to people between certain ages. Used in con-
junction with a defined benefit pension plan, window plans typically treat
participants as if they were older or had more years of service in the calcu-
lation of pension benefits. Of course, and especially in conjunction with a
defined contribution pension plan, window plans can also simply offer cash
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12 Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
payments for faculty members who retire within the designated time frame.
For the most part, the primary objective of window plans is to achieve a
short-term increase in retirements consistent with an institution’s attempt
to reduce the size of its faculty or to redress a significant problem in the
composition of its faculty. These plans are less likely to be adopted to solve
long-term problems associated with later retirements.
In addition to observing national patterns in the use of retirement incen-
tive programs, it is important to know how knowledgeable administrators
on individual campuses are matching incentives to the faculty employment
and retirement challenges they face. In a series of chapters, researchers and
administrators who participated in the design of retirement incentive pro-
grams at Cornell University, the University of California, the University of
Wisconsin, and the University of Virginia examine the experience in depth.
In Chapter 5, Ronald Ehrenberg, Michael Matier, and David Fontanella
analyze Cornell University’s response to the end of mandatory retirement.
Cornell is a unique institution with six of its colleges privately funded and
four colleges operated byCornell under contract with the State of NewYork.
All faculty in the six privately funded colleges are enrolled in a defined con-
tribution retirement program, while faculty in other colleges have a choice
of participating in a state defined benefit retirement plan or an optional re-
tirement program.7
In the fall of 1996, a joint faculty-administrative committee was appointed
to make recommendations on how Cornell should respond to the elimina-
tion of mandatory retirement.The committee began by examining employ-
ment records, which indicated that the average age of retirement fluctuated
without trend until 1993–94, but since rose by two years. In addition, some
faculty who reached age 70 during this period remained on the job.8 Fewer
retirements reduced hiring opportunities and resulted in an aging of the
faculty. The proportion of all faculty under the age of 35 declined from 15
percent in 1982–83 to 5 percent in 1996–97.The percent of the faculty over
the age of 60 increased from 13 to 21 percent during the same period. The
number of newly hired, tenure-track faculty declined from 108 in 1987–88
to 48 in 1995–96.The committee determined that the decline in hiring had
three adverse effects: (1) Cornell was hiring fewer faculty with new ideas and
new perspectives; (2) fewer new hires meant the university was less able to
diversify its faculty along gender, racial, and ethnic lines; and (3) fewer new
hires had the potential to limit Cornell’s ability to remain at the frontier in
rapidly changing fields and to shift faculty resources into new areas of in-
quiry.
As it began its deliberations, the committee was instructed by the pro-
vost to avoid a buyout plan because of the belief that these plans would not
be cost effective. Since a majority of Cornell faculty members retire before
age 70, the worry was that any plan that paid people to retire prior to age
70 would be paying many people to do what they would have done anyway.
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Introduction 13
Moreover, the legal status of defined contribution-based buyout plans that
limited participation to faculty prior to a certain age was thought to be am-
biguous.
Instead, the committee made a series of other recommendations to in-
crease retirement rates: (1) faculty should be provided financial planning as-
sistance over their life cycles to assure that they make informed investment
decisions with their retirement accounts; (2) more information should be
available about the importance of investing in tax-deferred supplementary
retirement accounts; (3) faculty should be encouraged to discuss their re-
tirement plans beforehand with department chairs or college officials to en-
able academic units to improve their planning; (4) salary increases should be
linked to individual productivity; (5) the status of emeriti professors should
be enhanced; (6) university retirement contributions to the defined con-
tribution plans should be capped; and (7) the existing phased retirement
program should be expanded.
The Cornell faculty objected to several of the key points in these recom-
mendations. Specific arguments were that the recommendation to match
salary increases to productivity was offensive and should be deleted; the
phased retirement program was not generous enough and it should be
amended; and capping retirement contributions was merely an attempt to
cut compensation and should be eliminated. The committee report was
been amended to reflect these criticisms at the time of publication the plan
was under consideration in the office of the provost.
In Chapter 6, Ellen Switkes looks at one of the largest retirement incentive
plans in higher education, the three Voluntary Early Retirement Programs
(VERIPs) adopted by the University of California (UC) in the early 1990s.
Faced with a disproportionate share of the UC faculty over the age of 55,
a state budget crunch, and the immanent elimination of mandatory retire-
ment at what some consider the nation’s premier public research university
system, administrators designed a retirement incentive plan that used the
university’s overfunded defined benefit pension plan to bear most of the
cost of the incentive plan.
Each of the three VERIPs involved increasing the annual retirement in-
come to which the faculty member was entitled. It did so by adding years
of service to the pension formula used to calculate retirement income, thus
increasing the faculty member’s proportion of final income. In order to tar-
get certain age groups, more or fewer years were added, depending on the
faculty member’s age.
EachVERIPwasmore generous than the last. But the response did not en-
tirely parallel the program’s generosity (for another perspective, see Penca-
vel 1997). In response to the first plan, which was introduced in 1990, 31
percent of eligible faculty accepted early retirement. The second early re-
tirement plan, which followed in 1992, providedmore generous benefits and
extended the boundaries of eligibility to older faculty. Only 18 percent of
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14 Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
eligible faculty accepted the early retirement offer. The final plan was even
more generous, and 33 percent of eligible employees took early retirement
in response to this last offer.
The response to these early retirement offers by UC provides an especially
useful view of how employee expectations influence acceptance rates. The
first offer was almost unprecedented and was billed as a one-time event and
not to be repeated. The second offer was also publicized as a last chance,
but employees apparently felt they could hold out for another round. In
the third instance, word passed among the faculty that there truly would be
no future offer this time, likely contributing to the highest acceptance rate
of all.
In Chapter 7 Robert O’Neil provides a unique perspective on the effects
of ending mandatory retirement. He is former president of the University
of Wisconsin and the University of Virginia. He was also a member of the
1989–91 National Research Council Committee on Ending Mandatory Re-
tirement in Higher Education. O’Neil presided over theWisconsin and Vir-
ginia campuses whenmandatory retirement was eliminated. He outlines the
transition that each institutionmade to ending ofmandatory retirement and
other forces that affected both faculty behavior and policy choices available
to each institutions. He strongly supports the need for joint planning be-
tween administrators and faculty.
In light of the intended and potential unintended incentives associated
with retirement incentive programs, in Chapter 8, JohnKeefe analyzes these
programs from the point of view of a faculty member who must decide on
the benefits and opportunity costs of continuing to work or accepting the
offer. He concludes that the intangible elements of retirement incentive
programs, including the nonmonetary aspects, can be critical in the ulti-
mate success of these programs. College and university administrators and
faculty would be wise to consider issues such as access to campus facilities,
professional status, and similar postretirement issues when formulating re-
tirement incentive programs.
Assessment of Research Findings
Amajor contribution of this volume is the critical assessment of current and
past research on faculty retirement and the identification of unsettled re-
search questions. Some of the foremost authorities on faculty retirement de-
cisions, the ending of mandatory retirement, and the state of the academic
labor contributed summary assessments concerning faculty retirement in
the twenty-first century.
An important question about faculty retirement behavior in response to
the ending of mandatory retirement is whether current ex post patterns are
surprising compared to anticipated or ex ante effects. In Chapter 9, Sharon
Smith examines the research that predicted changes in retirement behav-
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Introduction 15
ior before the end of mandatory retirement and compares it to the results
of the Ashenfelter and Card study and the Clark et al. study of retirement
rates and age structure. She concludes that recent patterns are not surpris-
ing and that college and university retirement policies should be based on
hard analysis of the circumstances facing each institution rather than on be-
liefs or attitudes. In particular, spending on retirement incentive programs
should be undertaken only in response to a clear analysis of faculty demo-
graphics and retirement behavior so that such expenditures will be targeted
on a clear need.
In addition to the question of changing retirement behavior and the im-
plementation of retirement incentive programs, colleges and universities
face other critical issues associated with faculty retirement. Karen Holden
and Lee Hansen analyze several of these issues in Chapter 10. They review
the findings of their study of faculty retirement completed prior to the in-
crease in mandatory retirement age that took effect in 1982. They compare
these findings to the results reported in this volume.
From these chapters the following conclusions emerge:
Consensus. Views vary among institutions and between faculty and admin-
istrators on the impact of ending mandatory retirement. This variation
suggests that individual campuses are differentially affected and therefore
should examine their own circumstances carefully before choosing future
retirement-related policies.
Incentive programs. Most representatives of higher education faculty and
administrators believe that ending mandatory retirement has benefited fac-
ulty who can now exercise choices available to all other working Americans.
However, they both recognize that for planning and budgeting purposes,
individual campuses and multicampus systems may need to decrease the
uncertainty associated with future retirement patterns by offering individu-
als the opportunity to retire earlier than they might otherwise choose to do
so. Therefore, both faculty and administrators support well-designed, non-
coercive retirement incentive programs that increase certainty choice while
preserving individual rights.
National demographic trends. At the national level, projecting or predicting
future faculty supply anddemand is next to impossible because forces affect-
ing this market cannot be fully specified.These include, but are not limited
to, future government support, industrial growth patterns, and immigration
policies and patterns. Conclusions about the effects of ending mandatory
retirement for faculty must be placed in this uncertain context.
Awareness. Few colleges and universities are fully aware of what they can
and cannot do to provide retirement incentives to their employees. Edu-
cation and information programs are needed in this regard, especially
now that the law affecting retirement incentives in higher education has
changed.
The final word is far from in on this subject.The consequences of eliminat-
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16 Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
ing mandatory retirement have not yet been fully felt or understood. Addi-
tional studies and discussion of this issue and its effect on higher education
are needed.
Guidance for Administrators and Faculty
Taken as a whole, this volume identifies a series of important retirement-
related concerns and policies for dealing with those concerns:
Retirement Rates and Patterns
College and university faculties are aging. The surge of faculty hiring in the
1960s and early 1970s continues to dominate the academic labor market.
The aging of faculty hired to teach the baby boomers combined with smaller
cohorts of subsequently hired faculty are the primary cause of the aging of
the academic labor market. These trends show up in aggregate academic
labor market data as well as data on the faculties of particular colleges and
universities. There has been an increase in the average age of faculty mem-
bers, a decrease in the proportion of the faculty members under age 40, and
an increase in the proportion of the faculty members over age 55.
The elimination of mandatory retirement has led to lower retirement rates for those
faculty members who continue to work until age 70. Although older professors
remaining at their university posts can be found at nearly all types of in-
stitutions, they are concentrated at research universities. In the past, these
professors would have been forced to retire. Nowmany of themare choosing
to remain as full-time, tenured faculty members for several additional years.
To date, the increase in retirement ages has played only a small role in the
aging of faculties. However, the declining probability of retirement among
older professors, particularly at research universities, will become more im-
portant in coming years as the relatively large number of faculty members
hired in the 1960s and early 1970s begins to reach traditional retirement
ages.
Future cohorts of retirees will look much different from today’s. In the twenty-first
century, faculties will include more minorities, more foreign-born scholars,
and more women. Future retirement decisions by these faculty are uncer-
tain. Will they be similar to those of today’s older professors, who are pre-
dominately white men, or will they work longer? Academic administrators
should plan for the changing composition of their faculty and its impact on
retirement patterns. And institutions that have experienced, as many have,
a shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions should be pre-
pared for changes in how these programs affect retirement decisions. Even
where pension plans haven’t changed, colleges and universities should also
prepare for the possibility that future cohorts will respond differently to the
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Introduction 17
incentives to retire or to delay retirement that are built in—intentionally as
well as inadvertently—to pension plans and retirement incentive programs.
We also need a better understanding of the impact of the increase in stock
market values during the 1990s on the retirement decisions of participants
in defined contribution pension plans. One study showed that observed re-
tirement rates were higher for those with relatively large defined contribu-
tion accumulations, but future retirement rates may be lower if, as is likely,
the next generation of older professors in defined contribution plans do not
continue to benefit from above-average equity returns.
Effects on Colleges and Universities
Later retirements can significantly affect colleges or universities. At institutions
where faculty size is not growing, retirements provide the major opportu-
nity for new hiring. Academic institutions use these hiring opportunities to
revitalize teaching and research, reallocate faculty resources, reduce labor
costs, and stay on the cutting edge of rapidly changing educational oppor-
tunities. Decreases in retirement rates will inhibit new hiring and retard the
ability of institutions to achieve these goals. Institutions where the retire-
ment age is increasing will experience a temporary sharp decline in hiring
and a less severe, long-term reduction in hiring due to the lengthening of
the average faculty career.
Disagreements among administrators and faculty and in the academic literature
regarding the impact of a larger number of older faculty members on colleges and uni-
versities have more than one source. Some of these disagreements are a result
of a lack of empirical information.We simply do not know whether or how
faculty retirement ages are changing on many individual campuses. Follow-
ing the lead of some of the researchers who presented their findings at this
conference, individual schools should track retirement patterns at their own
campuses.
Much remaining disagreement regarding the impact of faculty aging is
normative. Even if retirement ages have, are, or will change at some univer-
sities, the question of whether these changes will harm their institutions re-
mains. This answer may be a matter of perspective. Robert O’Neil, perhaps
the only former university president to experience retirement uncapping
at two institutions prior to 1994, points out that administrators are more
likely to focus on the financial burdens associated with an older faculty and
fewer hiring opportunities due to the lengthening of faculty careers. Fac-
ulty groups aremore likely to focus on themany positive contributions older
faculty can make to university life.
Themost important conclusion here is that the empirical issues should be
separated from the normative issues. Empirical questions can be resolved as
much as possible through further research and discussion. The normative
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18 Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond
issues should be clearly identified and confronted through continuing dis-
cussions among faculty and administrators on campuses, in state capitols,
and in Washington.
Retirement Incentive Programs
Retirement incentive programs have been adopted by a large number of academic in-
stitutions and they come in many forms. They can be early retirement buyouts,
phased retirement programs, or increased generosity of retirement plans.
Limited evidence suggests that these plans can alter faculty retirement be-
havior; however, it is unclear how cost effective these plans are.Much clearer
is the observation that few colleges and universities have targeted their use
of these programs to counteract the effects of endingmandatory retirement.
The recent legislation enacting a safe harbor for design of certain types of retire-
ment incentive programs has lifted a legal burden on many colleges and universities.
Current legislation now allows colleges and universities and their faculty mem-
bers access to the same sorts of retirement incentives that were available in
businesses and in public colleges and universities.
The new safe harbor legislation should be accompanied by efforts to increase aware-
ness of retirement incentive programs. College and university associations have a
responsibility to help educate administrators and faculty about the options
and appropriate uses of retirement benefit programs and retirement incen-
tive programs in particular. Financial planning programs can help faculty
to better prepare for retirement, while education and communication be-
tween faculty and administrators concerning incentive plans improves the
success rate of most early retirement programs.
Action and Assessment
Action and further needed analysis for the twenty-first century will require coopera-
tive, candid effort on the part of researchers, administrators, and faculty. If we are to
understand the full impact of the end of mandatory retirement and faculty
aging on colleges and universities, better data is needed both for the aca-
demic labormarket as a whole and for individual institutions. Analyses must
be conducted to document changes in faculty age structure and shifts in re-
tirement patterns, determine themagnitude of potentially adverse effects of
higher ages of retirement, and estimate the cost-effectiveness of retirement
incentives programs adopted to deal with the consequences of mandatory
retirement.
But better research is not enough. All of the major constituents in higher
educationmust be willing to come together to develop and examine the evi-
dence, formulate shared principles and conclusions based on the evidence,
and then promulgate policies and programs that address the challenges of
an aging faculty in the twenty-first century.
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Notes
1. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act was passed in 1967 forbidding dis-
crimination against workers aged 40 to 65. This act explicitly permitted employers
to force workers to retire at age 65 without cause. This act was amended in 1978
raising the upper age of protected workers to 70. This prohibited mandatory retire-
ment prior to the age of 70. Academic institutions were given an exemption from
this amendment until July 1, 1982.The ADEA was amended again in 1986, outlawing
the use of mandatory retirement at any age in most jobs. Once again, educational
institutions were given a temporary exemption until January 1, 1994, when the law
was extended to cover tenured faculty members.
2. Many of the following issues and ideas were first summarized in Clark andHam-
mond (1998). Some of the material in this book was presented in preliminary form
at a 1998 conference inWashington, D.C. on the effects of ending mandatory retire-
ment, sponsored by TIAA-CREF and the College of Management, North Carolina
State University.
3. Tenure does not mean that professors cannot be terminated; however, the uni-
versity must show that a professor is not performing at an acceptable level. Essen-
tially, termination of a senior professor would require the university to show that
the person is incompetent or is not performing required job assignments. Across
the country, concern about these issues has produced an increasing trend toward
academic accountability and posttenure review. Even with the closer monitoring of
faculty performance, the termination of a senior faculty member will be a painful
task especially when the person has been a long-term, productive professor.
4. This study received support from the AndrewW.Mellon Foundation, with addi-
tional support and cooperation from TIAA-CREF. Throughout the study, Ashen-
felter and Card and TIAA-CREF took a number of steps to ensure confidentiality
and anonymity.The researchers obtained permission fromTIAA-CREF and from the
human resources and/or benefits office of each institution involved. They were pro-
vided a limited amount of data by the institutions andbyTIAA-CREF, all of whichwas
carefully masked to preserve anonymity. As a result, the researchers and the spon-
soring and participating organizations cannot identify any individual or institution
involved in the study.
5. However, there is no indication of the value of retirement benefits for persons
not enrolled inTIAA-CREF. Faculty not enrolled inTIAA-CREFmay be participants
in other defined contribution plans or in defined benefit plans that are prevalent
among public institutions.
6. In a defined contribution pension, retirement benefits are not fixed by any for-
mula, but they do tend to increase with age. For example, many colleges and univer-
sities offer employer contribution rates that increase with an employee’s age. More-
over, an individual’s retirement income typically increases with the length of time
contributions remain invested as well as with the actuarial effect of any increase in a
person’s retirement age.Thus, other things being equal, the person who delays start-
ing a lifetime annuity will receive higher annual retirement income than someone
who starts an annuity earlier.
7. Most new faculty have enrolled in a defined contribution plan. Currently there
are fewer than twenty faculty in the state retirement plan.
8. Prior to 1994, Cornell rigorously enforced mandatory retirement; however, re-
tired faculty were eligible to be hired back for specified terms on a part-time basis
at a renegotiated salary.
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